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CDMA10/061 Introduction
In the literature on optimal monetary policy in open economies it is common practice to
model international asset markets in the form of trade in a complete set of Arrow-Debreu
securities.1 This makes it possible to side-step explicit analysis of portfolio allocation
problems. But new solution techniques (Devereux and Sutherland (2008a) and Tille and
van Wincoop (2010)) now make it possible to conduct a much more explicit analysis of
asset market structure and its implications for optimal policy. These techniques can be
used to consider explicitly the way in which asset markets aﬀect the transmission mech-
anism between monetary policy and welfare. In this paper, we use these new techniques
to examine in detail the role of the timing of asset trade relative to the timing of policy
decisions in determining the way monetary policy aﬀe c t sw e l f a r ei na no p e ne c o n o m y .
We show that the incentives faced by a policymaker can be very diﬀerent depending
on whether asset trade takes place before or after monetary policy is determined. If asset
trade takes place before policy is determined, equilibrium international portfolio positions
provide a high degree of insurance against the eﬀects of policy. This insurance is not
present if asset trade takes place after policy is determined. In eﬀect, if asset trade takes
place before policy is determined, the insurance provided by asset portfolios creates an
international spillover eﬀect which implies that some of the negative welfare impact of
policy in one country falls on foreign households. The insurance against the eﬀect of
policy, and thus the spillover eﬀect, is absent when asset trade takes place after policy is
determined. We show that the presence or absence of the insurance, and thus the presence
or absence of the spillover eﬀect, has a signiﬁcant impact on the welfare maximising choice
of monetary policy by national policymakers.2
The general principles of the argument just stated are straightforward to describe
and understand. The details of how these mechanisms operate within a fully speciﬁed
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with international trade in multiple assets
1See, for instance, Gali and Monacelli (2005), Devereux and Engel (2003), Benigno and Benigno (2006),
Pappa (2004), Faia and Monacelli (2008) and De Paoli (2009a 2009b). Some signiﬁcant contributions
to the open economy literature, however, are not based on trade in Arrow-Debreu assets. For instance,
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) assume a unit elasticity of international
trade. This implies that ﬁnancial market structure is irrelevant. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) and Kollmann
(2002) assume that international ﬁnancial trade is conﬁned to non-contingent bonds.
2Note that asset market timing is only relevant for welfare evaluation from the point of view of national
policymakers. When the global welfare eﬀects of policy are analysed from the point of view of a global
policymaker, the spillover generated by asset trade is fully internalised by the policymaker regardless of
the timing of asset trade. The timing of asset trade therefore has no impact on the incentives faced by a
global policymaker.
1are, however, much less obvious. For instance, in a dynamic model where asset trade
takes place period-by-period it appears that asset trade must inevitably take place after
a policy change has been announced. Does this imply that asset markets do not provide
insurance against policy changes? This paper provides a systematic analysis of the links
between policy decisions, consumption and welfare and shows explicitly how the timing
of asset trade aﬀects the incentives of the policymaker.
We show that policy decisions aﬀect consumption (and therefore welfare) via two asset
market transmission channels. One is a ﬂow eﬀect which arises in periods subsequent to
the policy change, while the other is a one-oﬀ capital gain eﬀect which potentially arises
i nt h ep e r i o di nw h i c hap o l i c yc h a n g ei sa n n o u n c e d .
The ﬂow income eﬀect is generated by a diﬀerence between home and foreign income.
If, for instance, the home monetary authority follows a policy rule which tends to depress
the expected level of home output, the ﬂow income eﬀect will, other things being equal,
imply a reduction in home consumption. The capital gain eﬀect, on the other hand, is
the change in the value of the home country portfolio which occurs at the time monetary
policy is announced (i.e. in the initial period). A fall in expected home income causes a fall
in the value of home equity, which leads to a one-oﬀ capital gain for the home population
in the initial period (because home households optimally hold a negative external position
in home equity).
It is shown that the timing of asset trade in the initial period is critical in determining
whether the capital gain valuation eﬀect is present or not. If asset trade in the initial
period takes place before policy is determined then the capital gain valuation eﬀect is
present. But if asset trade in the initial period takes place after policy is determined, the
capital gain valuation eﬀect is absent. It is shown below that the presence or absence of
this capital gain valuation eﬀect has an important impact on the incentives faced by the
monetary policymaker.
While there is now an extensive literature examining optimal monetary policy in open
economy models, there has been no previous detailed analysis of the implications of asset-
trade timing for the welfare eﬀects of policy in a dynamic multi-period setting. Indeed in
much of the current literature (see e.g. Gali and Monacelli (2005), Benigno and Benigno
(2006), Pappa (2004) and Faia and Monacelli (2008)) there is an implicit assumption
that policy decisions are made after asset trade takes place in the initial period. There is
rarely any justiﬁcation for this assumption nor is there any recognition that it can have
important implications for the welfare eﬀects of monetary policy.
Senay and Sutherland (2007) do provide a basic analysis of asset market timing in
2a very simple static single-period model and merely state and demonstrate the general
principle that asset market timing can aﬀect optimal policy choices.3 However, asset mar-
ket trade, and all matters related to the sequencing of events, obviously raise questions
which can only adequately be addressed in a dynamic multi-period setting. In addition,
the single-period model used in Senay and Sutherland (2007) lacks the complex dynam-
ics that are integral to the standard workhorse models used in the international macro
literature. As we show below, the extension of the basic single-period result to a dy-
namic setting is far from straightforward and the main contribution of the current paper
is therefore to show exactly how the timing of asset trade and the welfare eﬀects of policy
interact in a multi-period model of the type which is standard in the international macro
literature.
In dynamic multi-period models with Arrow-Debreu asset trade, one can think about
asset trade, and policy being set, in the initial time period. In such a framework, one way
to approach the dynamic analogue of the Senay and Sutherland (2007) analysis would be
to consider the timing of trade in Arrow-Debreu securities relative to the timing of policy
within that initial period. However, in a more realistic dynamic setting, trade in realistic
assets (such as bonds and equities) takes place period by period, rather than exclusively
in the initial period. In this more realistic setting, it seems that asset trade will inevitably
be taking place after policy decisions have been made. This paper focuses on this more
realistic setting and analyses the welfare eﬀects of policy in a model with period-by-period
trade in equity shares. Our analysis shows clearly that the question of the timing of asset
trade relative to policy arises even when asset trade takes place period by period. The
timing issue relates to the selection of an initial portfolio of asset holdings. It is this initial
portfolio which determines the capital gain valuation eﬀect in the initial period. The fact
that asset trade also takes place in all periods subsequent to the policy decision does not
undermine the importance of the timing of asset trade in the initial period.4
3In an analysis of optimal capital taxation in a small open economy Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003)
also discuss an issue related to the timing of asset trade. Rather than focusing on the timing of asset trade
per se, they frame the problem in terms of the presence or absence of Arrow-Debreu securities which are
speciﬁcally contingent on the decisions of the policymaker. The assumption that trade in Arrow-Debreu
securities takes place after policy decisions are made is eﬀectively equivalent to assuming there are no
Arrow-Debreu securities which are contingent on policy decisions.
4We assume that policy is represented by a credible once-and-for-all decision about a policy rule. An
alternative approach would be to assume that policy is re-optimised period by period. This creates a
dynamic game between the policymaker and traders in asset markets. The equilibrium of this dynamic
game will depend on the timing of asset trade relative to the policy decision with-in each period. We
focus on the case where policy is a once-and-for-all decision because this corresponds more closely to the
standard assumption in the existing literature on monetary policy in open economies. The alternative
assumption (where policy is re-optimised period by period) is likely to be an interesting topic for further
3Before describing our analysis in detail, it is important to emphasise that we are
not arguing that the modelling of asset market timing (relative to policy decisions) in
itself represents a way to analyse market imperfections in international ﬁnancial markets.
What we are showing is that asset market timing has important logical implications for
the interaction between ﬁnancial markets and policy which have not been addressed in the
existing literature. This issue arises in both complete markets and incomplete markets
settings and can co-exist with many forms of asset market imperfection.
The analysis presented below is based on a simple two-country new-Keynesian model.
Policy is represented in terms of a choice of a feedback parameter in a monetary policy
targeting rule. This choice is made in the initial period. This simple framework provides
clear analytical solutions and thus helps to establish the main underlying principles. The
issues highlighted here are, however, applicable to a wide range of open economy macro
models.5
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model structure; Section 3
discusses the general approach to solving the model; Section 4 analyses the impact of the
timing of asset trade on the determination of consumption; Section 5 demonstrates the
implications for the welfare eﬀects of policy; and Section 6 concludes.
2 Model structure
The model is a standard open economy DSGE model of the type which has been widely
used to analyse monetary policy in open economies (see for instance, Gali and Monacelli
(2005) and Benigno and Benigno (2006)). The details of the speciﬁc model presented
below are chosen for illustrative purposes only. The results emphasised in this paper,
however, apply to a wide range of models.
The model consists of two countries, home and foreign, inhabited by a continuum of
inﬁnitely lived individual households which are both consumers and producers. House-
research.
5In the model used below, equity trade is suﬃcient to support full risk sharing (for a given setting
of monetary policy). Our asset-trade-before-policy case corresponds precisely to the Arrow-Debreu case
which is the standard assumption in the literature. But the same issues (about the timing of asset trade)
also arise when there are not suﬃcient assets to support full risk sharing. In cases such as this there is
not full insurance, but the timing of asset trade aﬀects the degree to which there is insurance against
policy changes, and this insurance will work through a capital gain valuation eﬀect in the initial period.
See Devereux and Sutherland (2008b) for an example of how the setting of monetary policy can aﬀect
portfolio allocation in a model where markets are incomplete. Devereux and Sutherland (2008b) do not
explicitly analyse the welfare eﬀects of policy, nor do they consider issues related to the timing of asset
trade.
4holds consume a basket of diﬀerentiated, perishable goods of total measure unity. Home
country households produce fraction n of goods while foreign households produce the re-
maining n∗ =1− n. Each individual household uses labour eﬀort to produce a single
good and is the monopoly supplier of that good. Nominal price inertia is modelled in the
form of Calvo (1983) price setting.
Asset trade takes the form of trade in equity claims on home and foreign income.
There is assumed to be only one source of random disturbances in the model, so trade in
two equity claims allows full sharing of consumption risk arising from this single source
of shocks.
We focus on monetary policy and welfare from the point of view of home country
households. The foreign country’s monetary stance is taken as given. The structure of
the foreign economy is otherwise identical to the home country, so the model descrip-
tion focuses on the home country equations. Where foreign variables do arise, they are
indicated with an asterisk.
2 . 1 H o u s e h o l d sa n dt h eg o o d sm a r k e t



















where C is a consumption index deﬁned across all home and foreign goods, P is the
consumer price index, y(h) is the output of good h and Et is the expectations operator
conditional on time-t information. K, ρ and μ are positive constants and 0 <β<1.























where CH and CF are indices of individual home and foreign produced goods with an
elasticity of substitution between individual goods φ, where φ>1.T h e p a r a m e t e r θ is
the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. Home and foreign goods are
assumed to have equal weight in the consumption basket. Combined with an assumption
of producer currency pricing, this ensures that purchasing power parity holds in all states
















where PH and PF are the aggregate price indices for home and foreign goods.
Goods prices are assumed to be set in the currency of the producer and are subject
to Calvo (1983) price contracts. The probability that a given producer changes its price
in any particular period is taken to be a constant, (1 − γ).T h eﬁrst-order condition for


















where yt,s is the period-s output of a home producer whose price was last set in period t.
Prices are assumed to be subject to “cost-push” disturbances, A, where
logAt = ζ logAt−1 + εA,t (5)
where εA is symmetrically distributed over the interval [−ε,ε] with E[εA]=0and
Va r[εA]=σ2
A. Cost push disturbances are assumed to aﬀect only home country pric-
ing and are the only source of shocks in the model. Foreign producers are not subject to
cost push disturbances.
2.2 Asset markets
International ﬁnancial trade takes the form of trade in equity claims on the value of home
and foreign aggregate output. Thus the home equity is a claim on Yt = ytPH,t/Pt, while




t , where yt and y∗
t are aggregate outputs
of home and foreign goods. Equity trade takes place period by period. At the end of
period t, home and foreign households allocate their net asset position across portfolios
of the two equity assets. In period t +1 , shocks are realised and output, goods prices,
equity prices and equity pay-oﬀs are determined. At the end of period t +1equity trade
is repeated and portfolios are reallocated and held into period t +2 ,a n ds oo nf o re a c h
future period.
The real pay-oﬀ to a unit of the home equity purchased in period t is deﬁned to be
Yt+1 + Zt+1,w h e r eZt+1 is the real price of home equity in period t +1 .T h u st h eg r o s s
6real rate of return on the home equity is r1,t+1 =( Yt+1 + Zt+1)/Zt, and the gross real
return on foreign equity is r2,t+1 =( Y ∗
t+1 + Z∗
t+1)/Z∗
t . The aggregate budget constraint of
t h eh o m ec o u n t r yc a nt h e nb ed e ﬁned as follows
α1,t + α2,t = α1,t−1r1t + α2,t−1r2t + Yt − Ct (6)
where α1,t−1 and α2,t−1 represent the real external holdings of home and foreign equity,
brought into period t from the end of period t − 1.6
It is useful to deﬁne Wt = α1,t + α2,t to be the total net claims of home agents on
the foreign country at the end of period t (i.e. the net foreign assets, or NFA,o fh o m e
agents). The budget constraint can then be re-written as
Wt = r2,tWt−1 + Yt − Ct + α1,t−1rx,t (7)
where
rx,t = r1,t − r2,t (8)
Here the foreign equity is used as a numeraire and rx,t measures the "excess return" on
t h eh o m ee q u i t y .B e c a u s eα1,t and α2,t measure the external position of the home country








To simplify notation, in what follows we will drop the subscript from α1,t and simply refer
to αt. It should be understood, therefore, that αt = α1,t = −n∗
n α∗





Preferences and the structure of asset markets imply that optimal consumption choices






6We adopt the notational convention that α1 and α2 represent external holdings of equities. That
is, α1 is the value of claims on home output sold by home households to foreign households, and α2 is
the value of claims on foreign output sold by foreign households to home households. An alternative
notational convention is to measure portfolio positions in terms of the total (internal plus external)
holdings of assets. Our choice of notational convention involves no loss of generality and proves to be
particularly convenient for deriving our results. See the Appendix for an explanation of the link between
the two notational conventions.




2.3 Monetary policy and asset trade in period 0
Monetary policy is modelled in the form of a targeting rule. The monetary authority in
the home country is assumed to choose the monetary instrument (which is not modelled




+ δlogAt =0 (11)
Thus the monetary authority follows a state-contingent inﬂation targeting policy where
δ measures the degree to which producer-price inﬂa t i o ni sa l l o w e dt ov a r yi nr e s p o n s et o
cost push shocks. The analysis below focuses on the welfare implications of the choice of
δ. For the purposes of explaining and illustrating the main points of this paper, the precise
functional form of the policy rule is not a central issue. The key comparison which we
a n a l y s eb e l o wi st h ed i ﬀerence in the optimal choice of δ between the asset-trade-before-
policy case and the asset-trade-after-policy case.7
The foreign monetary authority is assumed to follow a similar targeting rule. In
the foreign case, however, δ is assumed to be zero (i.e. the foreign monetary authority
completely stabilises the foreign PPI inﬂation rate). The foreign rule is taken as exogenous
and ﬁxed and our analysis is focused on the policy problem of the home country.
In the initial period (i.e. period 0), it is assumed that the only events that occur are:
¥ A once-and-for-all decision by the home policymaker about δ, which is immediately
announced publicly.
¥ International trade in equities to establish portfolio allocations to be carried into
period 1.
The aim of the paper is to investigate the implication of the timing of asset trade
in period 0 relative to the timing of the policymaker’s decision about δ.T h e r e a r e t w o
alternative assumptions: (1) asset trade before policy; or (2) asset trade after policy.
7For the purposes of this paper, a rule of the form given in (11) is nevertheless a reasonable choice as
a benchmark example because it is known that optimal policy takes this form in the context of a closed
economy model analogous to the model outlined above (see for instance Woodford, 2003).
8We assume that households enter period 0 with a common prior belief about the
value of δ which is held with subjective certainty. The value of δ actually chosen by the
policymaker may, however, be diﬀerent from households’ prior belief.
We further assume that households enter period 0 with zero net foreign assets and
zero gross asset positions, so prior to trading assets in period 0, households have zero net
and gross portfolio positions. Asset trade allows households to establish optimal gross
portfolio positions which hedge against future shocks to A.
The crucial diﬀerence between the asset-trade-before-policy case and the asset-trade-
after-policy case is that households’ knowledge of δ a tt h et i m eo fa s s e tt r a d ed i ﬀers
between the two cases. This is illustrated in the time-lines shown in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows that, in the case where asset trade in period 0 takes place before the
policymaker determines δ, households will trade assets in period 0 at prices which are
determined before the true value of δ is known. Asset prices at the time of asset trade in
period 0 will incorporate household expectations of δ, i.e. asset prices will be determined
by the prior belief about δ. But the value of the portfolio at the start of period 1 (i.e.
the portfolio payoﬀ in period 1) depends on asset prices determined after δ is actually
determined (i.e. asset prices at the start of period 1 will incorporate information about
t h et r u ev a l u eo fδ). In other words, asset payoﬀsi np e r i o d1w i l lr e ﬂect any diﬀerence
between the prior belief about δ and its true value, so households will receive a capital
gain (or loss) as a result of the policy announcement. This capital gain aﬀects the NFA
position of home households at the start of period 1 and therefore aﬀects consumption
plans and welfare from period 1 onwards.
Figure 2 shows that, in the case where asset trade in period 0 takes place after the
policymaker determines δ, households will trade assets in period 0 at prices which are
determined after δ is chosen. These prices will also determine the value of the portfolio
at the start of period 1, so, in this case, the policy announcement will not create a capital
gain or loss at the start of period 1. The absence of the capital gain implies that policy
in this case will have a diﬀerent eﬀect on consumption and welfare compared to the
asset-trade-before-policy case.8
One way to interpret events in period 0 is in terms of a Stackelberg leader-follower
game. In the asset-trade-before-policy case the asset market acts as the Stackelberg
leader and the policymaker is the follower. In the asset-trade-after-policy case the roles
8Note that in the asset-trade-after-policy case it is important that households do not hold any gross
portfolio positions at the time of the policy announcement. "Asset prices" implicitly respond to the
policy announcement, but, in the absence of any gross positions, this has no impact on NFA.
9are reversed, the policymaker is the leader and the asset market is the follower. In each
c a s et h ef o l l o w e ri sa b l et om a k eo p t i m a ld e c i s i o n si nt h el i g h to ft h ed e c i s i o n sm a d eb y
the leader.
3 Model solution
The aim of this paper is to investigate the implications of the timing of asset trade for
the evaluation of home welfare in period 0,i . e .w e l f a r ea tt h et i m et h a tt h ep o l i c y m a k e r
makes a decision about policy, i.e. δ.
In models of the form outlined above, welfare analysis is typically based on a second-
order approximate solution for aggregate utility. Aggregate (per capita) home welfare in

























A second-order approximation of Ω can be written as follows
























φγ (1 − φ + φμ)










where O(ε3) contains terms of order higher than two in the variables of the model,9 and
πs = ˆ PH,s − ˆ PH,s−1.
Equation (13) shows that home welfare depends on the ﬁrst and second moments of
consumption, output and the rate of producer price inﬂation (as measured by π). In the
literature on optimal monetary policy there has been much discussion and analysis of
the properties of welfare functions of this form. This analysis is now very standard and
need not be repeated here. For the purposes of the current paper the main point that
should be noted is that home welfare depends positively on the ﬁr s tm o m e n to fh o m e
consumption and negatively on the ﬁrst moment of home output, i.e. positively on E0[ ˆ Cs]
and negatively on E0[ˆ ys] for s =1 .. ..∞.
In general, the policy parameter, δ, aﬀects the way the monetary instrument responds
to shocks and therefore aﬀects the second moments of the endogenous variables of the
9Note that ˆ Ω ≡ (1 − β)(Ω − ¯ Ω) ¯ Cρ−1. By writing welfare in this form, ˆ Ω can be interpreted in terms
of “steady-state consumption units”.
10model. In turn, second moments aﬀect ﬁrst moments of variables at the level of a second-
order approximation. So, for instance, δ aﬀects the risk premium on home equity (i.e. the
expected return diﬀerential between home and foreign equity) and also, via the impact of
risk on labour supply, δ aﬀects the expected level of output.10 The precise nature of the
links between δ and these variables is not the central issue in our analysis. It is suﬃcient
to note that the policy parameter aﬀects the expected level of output. The main question
of concern in our analysis is how the timing of asset trade aﬀects the link between the
expected level of output and the expected level of consumption.
Equation (13) shows that a reduction in the expected level of home output directly
increases home welfare (because it represents a reduction in work eﬀort for home house-
holds). The overall welfare impact of a fall in home output, however, depends on how
home consumption is aﬀected by the consequent fall in home income. Asset markets im-
pinge on the linkage between income and consumption via the impact of asset trade on the
cross-country sharing of consumption risk. The ﬁrst step in our analysis of asset market
timing is therefore to derive a second-order approximation of the relationship between in-
come, portfolio returns and consumption. This is based on a second-order approximation
of aggregate budget constraints.





















t +ˆ αt−1ˆ rx,t +
1
β
ˆ Wt−1ˆ r2,t (15)
In general, a bar over a variable indicates its value in the non-stochastic steady state and
a hat indicates the log-deviation from the non-stochastic steady state, except for ˆ Wt =
(Wt − ¯ W)/ ¯ C, ˜ α =¯ α/(β¯ Y ), ˆ αt−1 =( αt−1 − ¯ α)/(β¯ Y ), ˆ r1,t = β(r1,t − ¯ r1), ˆ r2,t = β(r2,t − ¯ r2)
and ˆ rx,t =ˆ r1,t − ˆ r2,t.
Notice that it is necessary to derive a solution for the gross portfolio position in the
non-stochastic steady state, ˜ α. For the above model, the solution method described by
10The policy parameter δ aﬀects the equilibrium variance of output and thus the variance of the realised
return on home equities. In equilibrium this aﬀects the risk premium on home equities. Likewise, the
variance of output aﬀects optimal labour supply because households are risk averse (i.e. a higher variance
of output reduces equilibrium work eﬀort).
11Devereux and Sutherland (2008a) yields the following result11




This implies that the home country holds a negative external position in home equity and
a positive external position in foreign equity. The intuition for this is obvious - optimal
risk sharing is achieved by holding a diversiﬁed portfolio of claims on home income and
foreign income. This is achieved by holding a negative external position in home equity
and a corresponding positive external position in foreign equity. Foreign households hold
the mirror-image portfolio.12
Note that, in principle, the portfolio in period 0 may depend on the timing of asset
trade, i.e. ˜ α in period 0 may diﬀer from ˜ α in all subsequent periods. However, in this model
the steady state portfolio is given by (16) in all periods (including period 0)r e g a r d l e s so f
the timing of asset trade.
We are interested in the evaluation of welfare at the time policy is determined in period
0, so the focus of the analysis is on the expectation of ˆ C at the time of the policy decision,
i.e. E0[ ˆ Ct], where E0 denotes expectation conditional on information at the time of the
policy decision. It is useful to decompose ˆ Ct as follows








t = ˆ Ct − ˆ C∗
t .B y d e ﬁnition total world real income equals total world real
consumption, so it follows that (to a second order approximation)
n ˆ Ct + n
∗ ˆ C
∗
t = nˆ Yt + n
∗ˆ Y
∗















11Strictly speaking, it is not necessary to use the Devereux and Sutherland method to derive solutions
for ˜ α and ˆ αt−1.T h e ﬁnancial structure in the above model implies that full consumption risk sharing
between home and foreign households is possible. Equilibrium gross portfolio positions can therefore
simply be backed-out from a solution of the model where income pooling is imposed. This approach
yields the same result as the Devereux and Sutherland method.
12Equation (15) also contains a term in the ﬁrst-order deviation of gross portfolios from the non-
stochastic steady state, ˆ αt−1. Devereux and Sutherland (2010) explain how to derive a solution for ˆ αt−1.
This term, however, drops out of the analysis once the conditional expectations operator is applied, so
an explicit solution is not required for the results reported below.
12so13
E0[ ˆ Ct]=E0[nˆ Yt + n
∗ˆ Y
∗








This provides part of the relationship between home-country consumption and home-
country income. The next step is to derive an expression for E0[ ˆ CD
t ].
The consumption Euler equation (9), and its foreign counterpart, imply that E0[ ˆ CD
t ]
is equal to a constant for period 1 onwards i.e.
E0[ ˆ C
D
t ]=E0[ ˆ C
D
1 ] for all t>1 (18)
so the analysis proceeds by deriving an expression for E0[ ˆ CD
1 ]. Using the home budget
constraint (14), its foreign counterpart, the usual transversality condition, equation (18)
and ˆ W0 =0 , the following is derived
E0[ ˆ C
D































This expression shows that E0[ ˆ CD
1 ] is equal to the sum of the discounted value of expected
future income diﬀerences, ˆ Yt − ˆ Y ∗
t , and portfolio returns (and a number of second-order
terms captured by λA,t).
It is convenient to rewrite (19) as follows
E0[ ˆ C
D
1 ]=( 1 − β)E0
∙























This expression separates out the impact of income and portfolio returns in period 1 from
the impact of the same variables in future periods. The portfolio return in period 1, ˜ αˆ rx,1,
depends on the timing of asset trade in period 0, whereas the portfolio return from period
2 onwards, ˜ αˆ rx,t for t>1, does not depend on the timing of asset trade. It is therefore
useful to treat these two terms separately.
13The derivation of λY,t (and a number of other expressions used below) is considerably simpliﬁed by





all t and in all states of the world, regardless of the timing of asset trade in period 0.
13The combination of equations (17) and (20) can now be used to analyse the impact of
asset market timing on the determination of home-country consumption.
4 The timing of asset trade, portfolio returns and
consumption
This section describes in detail the determination of portfolio returns. First, the expected
portfolio return for period 2 onwards is derived and substituted into the equation for
E0[ ˆ CD
1 ] (i.e. equation (20)). We then analyse portfolio returns in period 1. Because
this component of portfolio returns depends on the timing of asset trade, we consider
separately the asset-trade-after-policy and asset-trade-before-policy cases.
4.1 Portfolio return for period 2 onwards
In each period from period 2 onwards, optimal portfolio allocation and asset market















This is the risk premium on home equity.14 This expression shows that the risk premium,
up to a second order approximation, depends on one-period ahead conditional second
moments. These are constant by assumption, so Et[ˆ rx,t+1] is a constant for t>1.I t i s
useful to deﬁne R = Et[ˆ rx,t+1]. The law of iterated expectations implies
E0[ˆ rx,t+1]=Et[ˆ rx,t+1]=R (22)
So equation (20) becomes
E0[ ˆ C
D
1 ]=( 1 − β)E0
∙























14See Devereux and Sutherland (2008a) for a more detailed derivation of this expression.
144.2 Asset trade after policy
The expected excess return in period 1 depends on whether asset trade in period 0 takes
place before or after policy is determined. If asset trade takes place after policy is deter-
mined, asset prices in period zero are determined with full knowledge of the true value
of δ. The policy announcement therefore does not give rise to any capital gain or loss, so
the expected excess return in period 1 is again simply given by equation (21).
Equation (22) can be substituted into (23), which, after much simpliﬁcation, yields
E0[ ˆ C
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The Appendix provides a more detailed derivation of these expressions.
Equations (24) and (25) show how policy aﬀects E0[ ˆ CD
1 ] in the asset-trade-after-policy
case. The value of δ can aﬀect V via its impact on the expected level of home income
(relative to foreign income),
³
ˆ Yt − ˆ Y ∗
t
´
, or its impact on the second moments of home and
foreign income. These eﬀects can be thought of as capturing the on-going “ﬂow income
eﬀect” of policy on the sustainable level of home consumption.
To see the impact on home welfare it is necessary to consider the impact on the




































Equation (26) shows the link between home income and home consumption in the asset-
trade-after-policy case. In order to analyse the implications of asset market timing it is
now necessary to derive a relationship corresponding to equation (26) for the asset-trade-
before-policy case.
154.3 Asset trade before policy
If asset trade takes place before policy is determined, there is a potential capital gain or
loss which must be added to expected asset returns in period 1. At the time asset trade





0 denotes expectations conditional on information at the time of asset trade.
These expectations will be based on the prior belief about δ. Deﬁne ˆ Z∗T
0 and ˆ ZT
0 to be
asset prices at the time of asset trade in period 0 (i.e. ˆ ZT
0 and ˆ Z∗T
0 incorporate the
prior belief about the policy parameter δ). If ˆ Z0 and ˆ Z∗
0 are equity prices after the
announcement of policy (i.e. asset prices which incorporate knowledge of the true value
of δ), the capital gain caused by the policy announcement is given by
CG =(ˆ Z0 − ˆ Z
T
0 ) − ( ˆ Z
∗
0 − ˆ Z
∗T
0 ) (27)
The total expected excess return at the time of the policy announcement is thus
E0[ˆ rx,1]=R + CG (28)










This can be contrasted with (24), which is the corresponding equation in the asset-trade-
after-policy case. The comparison between these two equations shows clearly the diﬀerent
ways policy will aﬀect E0[ ˆ CD
1 ] in the two cases. Equation (24) shows that, in the asset-
trade-after-policy case, policy will only aﬀect E0[ ˆ CD
1 ] via the impact of policy on V .
Equation (29) shows that these eﬀects will also arise in the asset trade before policy case,
but in this case policy will have an additional eﬀect on E0[ ˆ CD
1 ] via the impact of policy
on the capital gain term, CG.
In order to understand the impact of policy in the asset-trade-before-policy case it is
obviously necessary to consider the capital gain term in more detail. The capital gain
term is eﬀectively a one-oﬀ valuation eﬀect created by the policy change. It will now be
shown that the capital gain term exactly oﬀsets the ﬂow income eﬀect of policy operating
16via V .
I ti ss h o w ni nt h eA p p e n d i xt h a tt h ed i ﬀerence between the home equity price and
the foreign equity price can be written in the form




















where λE,t is a collection of second-order terms which is deﬁned in the Appendix. The
capital gain term, CG =(ˆ Z0 − ˆ Z∗
0) − ( ˆ ZT
0 − ˆ Z∗T
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where RT and ET
0 are evaluated using households’ prior belief about the value of δ.
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The Appendix provides a more detailed derivation of these expressions.
Note that ET
0 terms are determined by the prior belief about δ. These terms are
therefore exogenous and independent from the true value of δ. Equation (31) therefore
shows that policy (in terms of the true value of δ) has no eﬀect on E0[ ˆ CD
1 ] in the case
where asset trade takes place before policy is determined. In other words the one-oﬀ
valuation eﬀect generated by the capital gain term exactly oﬀsets the ﬂow income eﬀect
operating through the future impact of policy on home income.
Equation (31) can now be used to derive the following expression for the discounted




















17Notice that the expectational terms in V T are formed before policy is determined, while
the expectational terms in other parts of (33) are formed after policy is determined.
So, unlike the asset-trade-after-policy case, no further simpliﬁcation of this expression
is possible. This expression can be used to show the impact of policy on home welfare.
In particular, it can be compared to (26), which is the corresponding equation in the
asset-trade-after-policy case.
5T h e w e l f a r e e ﬀects of policy
Before examining the welfare implications of the above results in more detail, it is useful to
summarise how the timing of asset trade aﬀects the link between policy and consumption.
Equation (29) shows that the policy choice creates two distinct eﬀe c t st h a ti m p a c to n
expected consumption. The ﬁrst is a ﬂow eﬀect, which operates directly via the term,
V , in (29). The second is a valuation eﬀect which arises via the capital gain term, CG,
in (29). If asset trade in period 0 takes place after policy is decided, the capital gain
term is not present. In this case the choice of δ aﬀects consumption only via the V term.
On the other hand, when asset trade takes place before policy is decided, equation (31)
s h o w st h a tp o l i c yh a sn oe ﬀect on E0[ ˆ CD
1 ]. This is because policy has an indirect eﬀect
on consumption via the capital gain term, CG. The capital gain valuation eﬀect exactly
oﬀsets the ﬂow income eﬀect. The CGis, in eﬀect, the payoﬀ to a portfolio which precisely
hedges against policy changes.15
The implications for the welfare eﬀects of policy can now be assessed by comparing
equations (26) and (33). These two equations show the relationship between the dis-
counted value of home income and the discounted value of home consumption. The main
diﬀerence between the two equations is in the size of the coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst moment of
home income. Equation (26) shows that this coeﬃcient is unity in the asset-trade-after-
policy case. This contrasts with equation (33) where the coeﬃcient is n, which is less
than unity. In other words, a monetary policy rule which depresses the expected level of
home income will have a one-for-one negative impact on home consumption in the asset-
15In the existing literature it is typically noted that complete international risk sharing implies a
relationship of the form UC∗/UC = k(SP∗/P), where UC and UC∗ are home and foreign marginal utilities
of consumption and k is an exogenous constant. In the context of the model of this paper, UC = C−ρ,
UC∗ = C∗−ρ and SP∗/P =1 , so equation (31), which shows that E0[ ˆ CD
1 ] is exogenous and constant in
the asset-trade-before-policy case, is consistent with the assumption that k is exogenous and constant.
On the other hand, in the asset-trade-after-policy case, equation (29) shows that E0[ ˆ CD
1 ] depends on the
policymaker’s choice of policy parameter. The asset-trade-after-policy case therefore implies that k is
endogenous and depends on policy choices.
18trade-after-policy case, but will have a less than one-for-one impact on consumption in
the asset-trade-before-policy case. The underlying explanation for the contrast between
the two cases relates directly to the hedging eﬀect of the CG term.
The diﬀering impact of policy on consumption in the two cases obviously has impli-
cations for the incentives facing the policymaker. In particular it has implications for
the trade-oﬀ between output (i.e. work eﬀort) and consumption. If the output of home
goods (y) and home income (Y ) are positively related (as will be the case when θ>1)
then the policymaker faces a less favourable trade-oﬀ between output and consumption in
the asset-trade-after-policy case than in the asset-trade-before-policy case. In the asset-
trade-after-policy case any policy which leads to a reduction in the expected level of home
output and income will be penalised by a one-for-one reduction in home consumption.
This tends to discourage the choice of a policy rule which depresses the expected level
of home output. In the asset-trade-before-policy case the impact on consumption is less
than one-for-one so that policymaker faces an incentive to move the policy parameter in
a direction which reduces the expected level of home output and income. In eﬀect, part
of the consumption impact of the policy choice is shifted on to foreign consumers.16
5.1 Numerical example
The results derived above are now illustrated using a calibrated version of the model. For
the purposes of this exercise the following parameter values are used:
β =0 .99,γ=0 .75,θ=4 ,φ =8 ,ρ =1 ,μ =2 ,ζ=0 .95,σ A =0 .01
We report results for two values of n: a large country case where n =0 .5;a n das m a l l
country case where n =0 .01. The large country results are shown in Figure 3 and
the small country results are shown in Figure 4. In the ﬁgures, welfare (in steady-state
consumption units), consumption and output are measured in terms of the percentage
deviation from a baseline stochastic solution where δ =0 .17
As discussed above, the main implications of the timing of asset trade operate via
the impact of the policy parameter on the discounted value of expected home output
and expected home consumption. Figure 3 plots these quantities, together with home
16The fact that international risk sharing can distort the incentive faced by national policymakers has
previously been noted by Wagner (2007). However, Wagner does not analyse the implications of the
timing of asset trade.
17In the asset-trade-before-policy case, the model is solved while imposing equation (31). The solution
in the asset-trade-after-policy case requires that equation (24) is imposed.
19welfare, for a range of values of δ. The upper panel of Figure 3 shows these plots for the
asset-trade-before policy case, while the lower panel shows the asset-trade-after-policy
case.
Figure 3 shows that the welfare maximising value of δ diﬀers between the two cases.
Optimal δ is 0.016 in the asset-trade-before-policy case and 0.006 in the asset-trade-after-
policy case. The underlying explanation for this diﬀerence is clear from the plots of
consumption and output. The upper panel shows that, as δ increases, the discounted
expected value of home output declines. This tends to raise home welfare (because it
represents a fall in work eﬀort). The discounted expected value of home consumption
also declines as δ rises, but the decline in consumption is less than the decline in output.
This reﬂects the cushioning eﬀect of the capital gain in the asset-trade-before-policy case.
The decline in consumption tends to reduce home welfare, but (initially at least) this is
not suﬃcient to oﬀset the welfare beneﬁto fl o w e rw o r ke ﬀort. The optimal value of δ is
therefore relatively high.
These eﬀects can be contrasted with the asset-trade-after-policy case shown in the
lower panel of Figure 3. There it can be seen that the expected discounted value of home
output also declines as δ is increased. But in this case the declining level of home output
is closely matched by the decline in the expected discounted value of home consumption.
The welfare beneﬁto fl o w e rw o r ke ﬀort is almost exactly oﬀset by the welfare cost of
lower consumption. The optimal value of δ is therefore relatively low.
Figure 4 shows the same set of comparisons for the small country example, where
n =0 .01. The lower panel of Figure 4 shows that the general shapes of the welfare,
output and consumption relationships are similar to the large country example. The
main diﬀerence between the small country and large country examples occurs in the
asset-trade-before-policy case. The upper panel shows that, in this case, welfare is now
convex in δ rather than concave (at least within the range of values of δ shown here).
T h ee x p l a n a t i o nf o rt h i si se v i d e n tf r o me q u a tion (33) and from the plot of consumption
in the upper panel of Figure 4. Equation (33) shows that, when n is very small, home
country consumption becomes almost entirely insulated from the level of home country
income. In terms of the upper panel of Figure 4, the relationship between consumption
and δ is close to a horizontal straight line. This implies that, as δ increases, the positive
welfare eﬀect caused by the reduction of home output is not oﬀset by any reduction in
consumption. Welfare is therefore monotonically increasing in δ (within the range of δ
shown here).
206C o n c l u s i o n
Using a standard dynamic general equilibrium model of an open economy, this paper has
shown how the timing of asset trade relative to policy decisions can aﬀect the welfare
evaluation of policy. It is shown that, if asset trade in the initial period takes place before
t h ea n n o u n c e m e n to ft h em o n e t a r yp o l i c yr u l e ,h o m ec o n s u m e r sa r ee ﬀectively insured
against the choice of policy rule. This allows the home country policymaker to choose
a policy rule which reduces home country work eﬀo r ti nt h ek n o w l e d g et h a tt h ei m p a c t
on home country consumption is cushioned by portfolio returns at the time of the policy
announcement. If, on the other hand, asset trade in the initial period takes place after the
announcement of the policy rule, this insurance is not present and home consumers have
to bear the full consumption consequences of a reduction in home output. The welfare
incentives faced by the policymaker are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the two cases. In
the asset-trade-before-policy case a welfare maximising policymaker has an incentive to
choose a policy rule which depresses the expected level of home output. This incentive
does not arise in the asset-trade-after-policy case. Numerical examples conﬁrm that this
can have a signiﬁcant impact on the welfare maximising policy rule (particularly in the
small economy example).
The current literature on monetary policy in open economies tends (implicitly) to focus
on the asset-trade-before-policy case. The analysis reported above shows that this is not
an innocuous assumption and demonstrates in detail how and why the timing of asset
market trade matters. In itself, however, the analysis provides no deﬁnitive guidance on
which assumption about asset market timing is most appropriate, either from an empirical
or theoretical point of view. From an empirical perspective, it is arguable that policy
decisions are always made against a background where agents hold diversiﬁed portfolios.
Policy announcements frequently give rise to asset price movements and therefore capital
gains and losses. The asset-trade-before-policy case therefore has some claims to empirical
relevance. However, regardless of empirical considerations, from a theoretical perspective
it seems unsatisfactory to judge the welfare eﬀects of policy in a framework where the
population of the country in question is implicitly insured against the potential adverse
eﬀects of policy. This paper shows that, when analysing the welfare eﬀects of policy in
open economies, it is important to acknowledge and understand the welfare incentives
created by international ﬁnancial markets. This is an issue which has, hitherto, received
little attention in the related literature.
21Appendix
Asset holdings and the budget constraint
In the text, we focus on a case where assets are deﬁned to be in zero net supply. Here
we show that a more conventional model with trade in equities which are in positive
net supply may easily be transformed into the algebra of zero net supply used in the
text. To see this in the context of the example model, assume that, instead of receiving
income from production, all income comes in the form of returns on holdings of home
and foreign equity. Let ω1,t and ω∗
1,t represent the home and foreign share of home equity,
and normalize so that the total supply of home equity is unity. Likewise, let ω2,t and
ω∗
2,t represent the home and foreign holdings of foreign equity, with total supply again
normalized to unity. Then in an economy where there is asset trade only in the two
equities, the home country faces a budget constraint given by:
Ztω1,t + Z
∗




t )ω2,t−1 − Ct (34)
where, as before, Zt and Z∗




1,t =1 ,ω 2,t + ω
∗
2,t =1
It is easy to show that (34) may be transformed into the budget constraint used in
the text, where assets are deﬁn e dt ob ei nz e r on e ts u p p l y .T os e et h i s ,r e - w r i t e( 3 4 )i n
the form





Zt−1(ω1,t−1 − 1) +
Z∗






t−1ω2,t−1 + Yt − Ct (35)
Now redeﬁning α1,t = Zt(ω1,t−1 − 1) as external holdings of the home asset and α2,t =
Z∗
t ω2,t as external holdings of the foreign asset, we arrive at









α2,t−1 + Yt − Ct (36)
which, given the deﬁnitions of r1,t and r2,t, is identical to (6). Thus, the model where
assets are in positive net supply is transformed into a model where the deﬁned assets are
in zero net supply.
22Derivation of equation (25)
Equation (22) can be substituted into (23) to yield
E0[ ˆ C
D
1 ]=( 1 − β)
µ






















which can be simpliﬁed to yield
E0[ ˆ C
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Note that R and λA contain only second-order terms and can thus be evaluated using
ﬁrst-order accurate expressions for ˆ C, ˆ C∗, ˆ r1, ˆ r2 and ˆ W. Furthermore, it is possible to
obtain expressions for ˆ C, ˆ C∗, ˆ r1, ˆ r2 and ˆ W in terms of ˆ Y and ˆ Y ∗ and thus express R and
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Derivation of equation (32)































23Note that λE and λA contain only second-order terms and can thus be evaluated using
ﬁrst-order accurate expressions for ˆ C, ˆ C∗, ˆ r1, ˆ r2 and ˆ W.As above, it is possible to obtain
expressions for ˆ C, ˆ C∗, ˆ r1, ˆ r2 and ˆ W in terms of ˆ Y and ˆ Y ∗ and thus express λE and λA in
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The returns on home and foreign equities are given by r1,t = Xt/Zt−1 and r2,t = X∗
t /Z∗
t−1,
where, for convenience, equity payoﬀsa r ed e ﬁned as Xt = Yt + Zt and X∗
t = Y ∗
t + Z∗
t .
Second-order approximation of these relationships imply
ˆ r1,t = ˆ Xt − ˆ Zt−1 + 1
2ˆ r2
1,t + O(ε3)
ˆ r2,t = ˆ X∗






ˆ Xt =( 1− β)ˆ Yt + β ˆ Zt + λX,t + O(ε3)
ˆ X∗
t =( 1− β)ˆ Y ∗
t + β ˆ Z∗


















Using (37), (38) and the fact that R = Et[ˆ r1,t+1 − ˆ r2,t+1], it follows that
ˆ Zt − ˆ Z
∗
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24and thus the diﬀerence between home and foreign equity prices can be written as follows
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t−1 − ˆ Z
∗2
t−1) − (ˆ r1,t ˆ Zt−1 − ˆ r2,t ˆ Z
∗
t−1)
Expression (40) is used in the main text to derive an expression for the capital gain at
the time of the policy announcement.
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